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Retirement savers in a Social Security system with a personal retirement
account (PRA) component would face the challenge of deciding how to al-
locate their PRA portfolios across a broad range of asset classes and across
many diﬀerent ﬁnancial products. Asset allocation decisions have impor-
tant consequences for retirement wealth accumulation because they aﬀect
the expenses of investing as well as the risk of low returns. The goal of this
chapter is to assess the relative risk associated with alternative asset allo-
cation strategies in PRAs. It also oﬀers insight on the consequences of
diﬀerent asset allocation rules in current private-sector deﬁned contribu-
tion (DC) plans, such as 401(k) plans.
Quantifying the risk associated with DC pension plans, and examin-
ing how individual choices aﬀect this risk, is an active topic of research.
Samwick and Skinner (2004) compare the risks associated with deﬁned
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NBER.beneﬁt and DC plans for workers with a set of stylized wage and employ-
ment trajectories. Many other studies have examined the risk of diﬀerent
investment strategies in the context of lifetime saving programs that re-
semble DC plans. Campbell and Viceira (2002) and Cocco, Gomes, and
Maenhout (2005) explore the optimal asset allocation between stocks and
bonds for life-cycle savers. Shiller (2005) tabulates the distribution of pos-
sible terminal wealth values when investors follow age-dependent asset al-
location rules in a saving program that he models on a DC Social Security
system. Poterba et al. (2005), hereafter PRVW (2005), examine how several
diﬀerent portfolio allocation strategies over the life cycle aﬀect retirement
wealth.
Previous ﬁndings about the level of retirement wealth associated with
DC saving programs, and about the risk of such wealth, are very sensitive
to assumptions about the expected return on corporate stock. Stocks have
oﬀered substantially higher average returns than bonds over the eighty-
year sample that is often used to calibrate the return distributions. PRVW
(2005) ﬁnd that this has an important eﬀect on the distribution of retire-
ment wealth for alternative asset allocation rules. Greater exposure to
stocks leads to a higher average retirement account balance. For a risk-
neutral retirement saver facing the historical return distribution, and
choosing a fraction between zero and 100 percent of his or her portfolio to
allocate to stocks, this suggests that allocating the entire portfolio to stocks
is optimal. As the risk aversion of a retirement saver increases, the optimal
share of the retirement portfolio that is held in stocks declines.
Over the past three decades, PRAs, such as those in 401(k) plans and
similar programs, have become the predominant form of retirement saving
in the private sector. The conversion from deﬁned beneﬁt to DC personal
account plans in the private sector has led to the introduction of ﬁnancial
products intended to reduce market risk. Some plan sponsors have begun
to oﬀer participants investment options that permit them to avoid asset al-
location decisions. One such innovation in the ﬁnancial services market-
place is the “life-cycle fund” that automatically varies the share of the
saver’s portfolio that is held in stocks and in bonds as a function of the
saver’s age or years until retirement. These funds have been one of the most
rapidly growing ﬁnancial products of the last decade. They oﬀer investors
the opportunity to exploit time varying investment rules, typically reduc-
ing equity exposure as retirement approaches, without the need to make
active investment management choices. In this chapter, we consider the
eﬀect of such life-cycle investment strategies on the distribution of retire-
ment wealth.
Our previous research on life-cycle asset allocation patterns, PRVW
(2005), considered how life-cycle allocation aﬀects the distribution of re-
tirement assets and the expected utility of reaching retirement with a given
asset stock. We tried to capture the potential utility of an investment strat-
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poor outcome. We recognized that wealth held outside the saver’s DC plan
can have an important eﬀect on utility associated with retirement assets at
retirement. We used Social Security earnings histories, rather than simple
stochastic processes, to model household contribution ﬂows to DC plans.
Our results capture the wide degree of heterogeneity in household earnings
experiences.
This chapter builds on our earlier methodology in several ways. First, we
model the asset allocation trajectories implied by the life-cycle funds. Sec-
ond, we model the returns to retirement investing using realistic expense
ratios and consider the impact of expense ratios on the accumulation of re-
tirement wealth. Third, we calculate expected utilities over a range of ﬁxed-
allocation and simple life-cycle strategies to derive the optimal strategy
within a given class of strategies. We then compare the returns from typi-
cal life-cycle fund strategies with those from strategies that yield the best
certainty equivalent utility. Many of the proposals for PRAs that have been
discussed in policy debates in recent years would allow individuals to chan-
nel a small proportion of their Social Security taxes to a PRA. Our anal-
ysis, however, considers a setting in which a substantial fraction of salary
is devoted to the PRA. We view such a system as a potential replacement
for the current Social Security system. By denying participants the safety
of a Social Security deﬁned beneﬁt “ﬂoor” under their retirement wealth,
we may overestimate the riskiness of PRA investments.
We ﬁnd that 100 percent stock portfolios tend to dominate when house-
holds have low risk aversion, when expected equity returns are equal to the
historical average, or when households have signiﬁcant amounts of non-
PRA wealth. More conservative strategies yield the greatest utility for
households with higher risk aversion, when expected equity returns are
lower, or when households have low non-PRA wealth. The typical life-
cycle investment product is valuable as a more conservative strategy, but its
value is reduced by the generally high expense ratios that investors will pay.
The largest expense ratios arise when the funds are invested in high-
expense, actively managed equity funds, although sometimes there are
surcharges for rebalancing between low-cost funds. Investors who would
prefer more conservative strategies can often increase their certainty
equivalent wealth through an optimally chosen ﬁxed-proportions portfo-
lio. If investors are incapable of rebalancing on their own, life-cycle prod-
ucts may add value, but whether they add value net of their expense ratios
depends on the household’s risk aversion and amount of non-PRA wealth.
The chapter is divided into ﬁve sections. The ﬁrst section summarizes
theoretical research on the optimal pattern of age-related asset allocation.
It then describes the life-cycle funds that have become increasingly popu-
lar in the retirement saving market. Section 8.2 describes the algorithm
that we use to simulate the distribution of retirement plan assets under
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cussion draws heavily on PRVW (2005). Section 8.3 describes our strategy
for calibrating the simulation model, for selecting the sample of house-
holds for analysis, and for assigning distributions of returns to each of the
assets in our study. The fourth section presents the various life-cycle asset
allocation rules that we consider, including some that involve age-
independent asset allocation rules. It then reports our central ﬁndings
about the distribution of retirement account balances under these diﬀerent
rules as well as the expected lifetime utility at retirement under various
rules. There is a brief conclusion.
8.1 Optimal Age-Dependent Asset Allocation
Rules and the Rise of Life-Cycle Funds
Financial economists have a long tradition of studying how a rational,
risk-averse, long-lived consumer would choose to allocate wealth between
risky and riskless assets at diﬀerent ages. Samuelson (1969), in one of the
ﬁrst formal analyses, challenged the conventional wisdom that an investor
with a long horizon should invest a larger fraction of wealth in risky assets
because of the possibility to average returns over a long period. This result
is related to the earlier, more general observation by Samuelson (1963) that
taking repeated identical uncorrelated risks augments the risk of the ﬁnal
outcome, rather than reducing it. In the context of the life-cycle portfolio
selection problem, when returns on the risky asset are serially uncorrelated
and there is no labor income, a rational investor should hold the same frac-
tion of wealth in risky assets at all ages. This analytical result runs counter
to the suggestion of many ﬁnancial advisors, who suggest that investors re-
duce their equity exposure as they approach retirement. Merton (1969) de-
rives similar results in the context of a lifetime dynamic optimization
framework.
Perhaps in part because this result is inconsistent with much ﬁnancial
practice, subsequent research has tried to uncover reasons why an investor
might choose to reduce equity exposure at older ages. Bodie, Merton, and
Samuelson (1992) argue that younger investors have greater ﬂexibility in
their subsequent labor supply decisions and that they should consequently
be more tolerant of risk. They suggest that younger investors may ration-
ally choose to hold a higher fraction of their portfolio in stock than older
investors. Gollier (2001) and Gollier and Zeckhauser (2002) derive the con-
ditions under which the option to rebalance a portfolio in the future aﬀects
portfolio choice. Their results suggest that under speciﬁc assumptions
about the structure of utility functions, the optimal portfolio share devoted
to equity will decline with age. Campbell et al. (2001) and Campbell and
Viceira (2002) develop numerical solutions to dynamic models that can be
used to study optimal portfolio structure over the life cycle if shocks to la-
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utility. Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) solve such a model in the
presence of nontradable labor income and borrowing constraints. They
ﬁnd that a life-cycle investment strategy that reduces the household’s eq-
uity exposure as it ages may be optimal depending on the shape of the la-
bor income proﬁle. An important parameter is the correlation of shocks to
the labor income process with investment shocks. Jagganathan and
Kocherlakota (1996) demonstrate that the higher this correlation, the less
the optimal asset allocation shifts away from equities as the individual
ages.
The empirical evidence on age-speciﬁc patterns in household asset allo-
cation suggests at best weak reductions in equity exposure as households
age. Gomes and Michaelides (2005) survey recent research on the corre-
spondence between theoretical models of life-cycle asset allocation and
empirical evidence on actual investment patterns. Ameriks and Zeldes
(2004) and Poterba and Samwick (2001) present empirical evidence on
how portfolio shares for stocks, bonds, and other assets vary over the life
cycle. The general conclusion is that equity shares decline very little at
older ages, although Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) ﬁnd some evidence that
some households cash out their equity holdings when they reach retire-
ment or annuitize their accumulated holdings in DC accounts.
To cater to the perceived desire of investors to reduce their equity expo-
sure as they age, and to help investors overcome the problems of inertia in
retirement asset allocation that are documented by Samuelson and Zeck-
hauser (1988), several ﬁnancial institutions have created life-cycle funds.
These funds are usually designed for an investor with a target retirement
date. Life-cycle funds were available from Fidelity Investments as early as
1988, and there were at least 250 target-year life-cycle funds in the mutual
fund marketplace in 2005. Several major mutual fund families now oﬀer a
sequence of diﬀerent funds targeted to investors with diﬀerent retirement
dates. In some cases, the life-cycle fund is a “fund of funds” that invests in
a mix of other mutual funds, while in other cases the fund manager holds
a speciﬁc pool of assets and alters the asset mix as the fund ages.
Figure 8.1shows the rapid growth in life-cycle fund assets during the last
eleven years. The ﬁgure indicates that life-cycle funds held $5.5 billion in
March 2000 and that their assets had grown to $47.1 billion by 2005. Many
of these funds are oﬀered in 401(k) plans. Marquez (2005) reports that He-
witt Associates estimates that 38 percent of all 401(k) plans oﬀer life-cycle
funds. At a time when Clements (2005) reports that the proliferation of in-
vestment options 401(k) plans has come under ﬁre, life-cycle funds oﬀer a
way to combine both stock and ﬁxed income options into a single fund and
to oﬀer investors a time varying asset allocation mix. Life-cycle funds are
sometimes suggested as a natural choice for the default investment option
in automatic enrollment 401(k) programs.
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age-phased asset allocation rules. Table 8.1 reports summary information
on the life-cycle funds oﬀered at leading mutual fund companies, which we
deﬁne as the set of mutual fund companies tracked by Morningstar. The
table shows the average mix of stocks and bonds currently held by funds
targeting diﬀerent retirement years. Many fund prospectuses indicate the
mix of various asset categories that will be held for an investor at speciﬁc
ages. We have interpolated between ages, when necessary, to estimate the
asset mix at a standardized set of ages.
The table also shows the net asset holdings and weighted average ex-
pense ratios of funds with diﬀerent retirement years. The expenses paid by
investors in these funds, which typically range between 60 and 80 basis
points per year, are substantially larger than would be paid if an investor
selected index mutual funds from a company oﬀering no-load index funds
with low expense ratios and then rebalanced among them over time. For
example, equity index funds, government bond index funds, and money
market mutual funds can be obtained from Vanguard with no load fees and
expense ratios of 10 to 20 basis points. However, if investors ﬁnd it diﬃcult
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Fig. 8.1 Aggregate net assets of target-year life-cycle funds, March 1994–March
2005
Notes: This ﬁgure shows quarterly net assets of all mutual funds categorized by Morningstar
as retirement or life-cycle funds that also have a target-year rebalancing feature. As of March
2005, the $47.1 billion represents assets in the following families: Barclays Global Investors
LifePath, Fidelity Freedom Funds, Fidelity Advisor Freedom, Intrust Bank NestEgg, Mass-
Mutual Select Destination Retire, Principal Investors Lifetime, Putnam Retirement Ready,
Scudder Target, State Farm Lifepath, TIAA-CREF Institutional Lifecycle, T. Rowe Price
Retirement, Vanguard Target Retirement, Vantagepoint Milestone, and Wells Fargo Out-
look. Net assets for life-cycle funds were assembled from fund reports and data provided by
Morningstar.to conduct such rebalancing on their own, or for other reasons neglect
planned rebalancing, they might be willing to pay the additional expenses
associated with target-year life-cycle funds in which the rebalancing hap-
pens automatically.
The high expense ratios for life-cycle funds are sometimes due to ex-
penses that the fund charges that are greater than the expenses charged by
the individual funds held by the life-cycle fund. In other cases, the expenses
are high because the life-cycle fund is not investing in the lowest-cost mu-
tual fund products but rather in more expensive actively managed mutual
funds.
8.2 Modeling Retirement Wealth Accumulation 
in Self-Directed Retirement Plans
To analyze the distribution of PRA wealth at retirement that is induced
by diﬀerent asset allocation strategies, we need to model the path of plan
contributions over an individual’s working life and to combine these con-
tributions with information on the potential returns to holding PRA assets
in diﬀerent investment vehicles. We do this following the approach in
PRVW (2005). Rather than using information on household earnings pat-
terns to estimate a stochastic model for the earnings process and then us-
ing that model to simulate earnings paths for our analysis, we draw actual
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expense No. of 
average
Retirement Years to Net assets ratio  fund  No. of
asset allocation (%)
year retirement ($ billion) (%) families funds Stocks Bonds Cash
2005 0 4.1 0.6 10 40 30.0 42.0 28.0
2010 5 11.2 0.8 13 45 49.4 35.4 15.3
2015 10 2.9 0.6 8 22 58.2 35.7 6.1
2020 15 14.5 0.8 13 45 69.7 24.6 5.7
2025 20 1.9 0.6 8 22 79.2 17.2 3.6
2030 25 8.3 0.8 12 39 81.7 13.8 4.5
2035 30 0.6 0.8 6 15 85.2 10.4 4.4
2040 35 3.3 0.8 11 38 88.0 8.4 3.5
Notes: Funds used in this analysis consist of all mutual funds categorized by Morningstar as retire-
ment or life-cycle funds that also have a target-year rebalancing feature. Net assets for these funds
as of March 31, 2005 were collected from fund reports and from Morningstar.com. The number of
funds diﬀers from the number of fund families for a given retirement year because funds have mul-
tiple classes of shares, and “number of funds” counts each share class as a separate fund. The
weighted average expense ratio is the average expense ratio including subfund expenses weighted by
fund net asset value. Asset allocations are also averaged with fund net asset value weighting. One
fund family also oﬀers funds with retirement years 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2045, and 2050. The in-
formation on these funds is not used in constructing this table.lifetime earnings histories from a large sample of households and carry out
simulations by combining the contribution paths for various earnings his-
tories with simulated patterns of asset returns. We focus our analysis on
married couples because they are ﬁnancially more homogeneous than
nonmarried individuals, some of whom never married and others of whom
have lost a spouse. About 70 percent of the individuals reaching retirement
age are in married couples.
We assume that 9 percent of the household’s earnings are contributed to
a DC plan each year. We further assume that the couple begins to partici-
pate in a PRA plan when the husband is twenty-eight and that they con-
tribute in every year in which the household has Social Security earnings
until the husband is sixty-three. Households do not make contributions
when they are unemployed or when both members of the couple are retired
or otherwise not in the labor force. We assume that both members of the
household retire when the husband is sixty-three if they have not done so
already and that they do not contribute to a retirement plan after that age.
To formalize our calculations, we denote a household by subscript i, and
denote their PRA contribution at age a by Ci(a)   .09   Ei(a) for Ei(a) the
household’s total earnings at age a.We assume that under this PRA system
there is a ﬁxed contribution rate of 9 percent. We express this contribution
in year 2000 dollars. We do not restrict Ei(a) to be covered earnings, but
rather assume that contributions are made for 9 percent of all wage and
salary earnings.
To ﬁnd the PRA balance for the couple at age sixty-three (a   63), we
need to cumulate contributions over the course of the working life, with ap-
propriate allowance for asset returns. Let Ri(a) denote the net-of-expense
return earned on PRA assets that were held at the beginning of the year
when the husband in couple iattained age a. The value of the couple’s PRA
assets when the husband is sixty-three is then given by:
(1) W i(63)  ∑
35
t 0  
t
j 0
[1   Ri(63   j)] Ci(63   t).
Ri(a) depends on the year-speciﬁc returns on stocks and bonds, on the mix
of stocks and bonds that the household owned when the husband was a
years old, and on the expense ratio. If the couple holds an all-stock portfo-
lio, then Ri(a)   (1 –  stock)   Rstock(a), where  stock is the assumed annual ex-
pense ratio on an equity fund. If the couple holds all bonds, Ri(a)   (1 –
 bond)   Rbond(a). A mixture of the two is of course possible. If the couple in-
vests in a life-cycle mutual fund, the asset return at age a will be (1 –  bond)  
Rlifecycle(a), which corresponds to the return on the mix of bonds and stocks
that will be held by the life-cycle fund on behalf of an investor of age a.
We use simulation methods to estimate the distribution of W i(63), aver-
aged over the households in our sample, for various asset allocation strate-
gies. By comparing the distributions of retirement plan assets under each
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sources. The distribution of outcomes is of substantial interest, but it does
not capture the household’s valuation of diﬀerent levels of retirement re-
sources. It can provide information on the potential frequency of low
wealth outcomes, but it does not provide a metric for comparing these out-
comes with more favorable retirement wealth values.
To allow for diﬀerential valuation of wealth in diﬀerent states of nature,
we evaluate the wealth in the PRA account using a utility-of-terminal
wealth approach. We assume that all households have identical prefer-
ences over wealth at retirement. We drop the household subscript i and as-
sume that the utility of wealth is described by a constant relative risk aver-
sion (CRRA) utility function
(2) U(W)   ,
where   is the household’s coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. The utility
of household wealth at retirement is likely to depend on both PRA and
non-PRA wealth, so we modify equation (2) to recognize this wealth:
(3) U(W PRA, W non-PRA)  
Because the eﬀect of a change in PRA wealth on household utility is sensi-
tive to the household’s other wealth holdings, we consider other assets on
the household balance sheet in our empirical analysis.
For a given household, each return history, denoted by h, generates a
level of PRA wealth at age sixty-three, W PRA,h, and a corresponding utility
level, Uh, where
(4) Uh   .
We evaluate the expected utility of each portfolio strategy by the probabil-
ity-weighted average of the utility outcomes associated with that strategy.
These utility levels can be compared directly for a given degree of risk tol-
erance, and they can be translated into certainty equivalent wealth levels
(Z) by asking what certain wealth level would provide utility equal to the
expected utility of the retirement wealth distribution. The certainty equiv-
alent of an all-equity portfolio, for example, denoted by the subscript
SP500, is given by:
(5) ZSP500   [EUSP500(1    )]1/(1  )   W non-PRA.
When a household has non-PRA wealth, the certainty equivalent of the
PRA wealth is the amount of PRA wealth that is needed, in addition to the
non-PRA wealth, to achieve a given utility level. We treat non-PRA wealth
as nonstochastic throughout our analysis.
(W PRA,h   W non-PRA)1  
   
1   
(W PRA   W non-PRA)1  
   
1   
W 1  
 
1   
Reducing Social Security PRA Risk at the Individual Level 263Our approach to computing DC plan balances at retirement resembles
one of the strategies developed in Samwick and Skinner (2004). Part of
their empirical analysis considers the pension beneﬁts that a sample of
workers would earn under several stylized deﬁned beneﬁt and DC plans. It
considers the beneﬁts experience of a sample of actual workers, with actual
earnings histories, under each plan. It does not, however, explore the sen-
sitivity of retirement wealth to alternative investment strategies.
Our approach exploits the rich cross-sectional variation in household
earnings trajectories. We use a large sample of Health and Retirement Sur-
vey (HRS) households to compute contribution paths for a PRA plan, and
we then randomly assign return histories to these contribution paths. The
result is a distribution of retirement balances for each household in the
HRS sample. We combine the wealth outcomes by aggregating households
into three broad educational categories to report our ﬁndings, but each en-
try in the following table represents an average over the outcomes for many
individuals. Our strategy can be thought of as drawing an HRS household
at age twenty-seven and giving it two independent draws: ﬁrst a wage tra-
jectory, which could be the actual wage trajectory for any of our sample
households who have a particular education level, and then a lifetime vec-
tor of asset returns, which could be any of 200,000 draws. The return tra-
jectory will determine the household’s retirement wealth, conditional on
the contribution ﬂow.
8.3 Calibration of PRA Wealth Simulations
We select a subsample of married HRS households for analysis, con-
struct their earnings trajectories, and measure their non-PRA wealth at re-
tirement. We then simulate retirement wealth based on these households’
Social Security earnings records. Our sample of households is larger than
that in PRVW (2005). We include all HRS couples headed by men aged
sixty-three to seventy-two in 2000 for which Social Security earnings his-
tories are available. Table 8.2 shows the eﬀects of conditioning the sample
on married couples in this age range. There are 3,833 HRS households with
Social Security earnings histories. The restriction to couples eliminates ap-
proximately 44 percent of that sample, and the age restriction removes an
additional 19 percent, leaving a sample of 1,400 households. The age re-
striction removes couples with heads between the ages of ﬁfty-nine and
sixty-two. Including this group would involve forecasting earnings beyond
the time period of the data.
The Social Security earnings records contain truncated information on
actual earnings. No earnings above the taxable maximum income level are
reported; the data are top-coded. The real value of the taxable maximum
earnings level for Social Security has varied over time, and so has the dis-
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cial Security records varies from year to year. In some years in the early
1970s, particularly for the group with the highest education level, the top-
code aﬀects more than half of the sample. Because the payroll tax cap was
not indexed for inﬂation during much of this period, and it changes as a re-
sult of legislative action, there are also substantial changes in this thresh-
old during brief periods. The magnitude of the top-coding problem may,
therefore, vary from year to year. We consider replacing the current Social
Security system with a PRA system that allows workers to contribute a
ﬁxed fraction of their earnings without limit. To describe contributions by
high-income workers, we, therefore, need to estimate earnings above the
taxable maximum for workers whose data records are top-coded.
We estimate a cross-sectional tobit equation for each pre-1980 year us-
ing the reported Social Security earnings for men in our sample. In the
years when a substantial fraction of earnings records are top-coded, we
ﬁnd that the tobit coeﬃcients are sensitive to the set of observations we in-
clude in the estimation subsample. In particular, including men with low
earnings can lead to “corrected” earnings for those at the payroll tax cap
that are substantially higher than the earnings cap, regardless of other in-
dividual attributes. The tobit results are more robust when we delete indi-
viduals with very low earnings levels from our sample. We, therefore, ex-
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Table 8.2 Sample composition, Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) households
Households Couples Couples 
59–72, with  59–72, with 63–72, with
All Social  Social  Social
households, Security Security Security 
head 59–72 earnings earnings earnings
Household head education less than high school
Survey households 1,579 1,086 540 374
Population counterpart 3,769.3 2,653.4 1,324.2 938.3
Household head high school education and/or some college
Survey households 2,793 1,954 1,076 689
Population counterpart 7,669.2 5,453.6 3,013.2 1,949.3
Household head at least college degree
Survey households 1,132 793 526 337
Population counterpart 3,411.6 2,390.6 1,611.8 1,013.6
Total
Survey households 5,504 3,833 2,142 1,400
Population counterpart 14,850.1 10,497.6 5,949.2 3,901.1
Source:Authors’ tabulations based on the 2000 wave of the HRS and the Social Security earn-
ings histories available for a subsample of HRS respondents. Population counterparts are cal-
culated using the household weights provided in the HRS.clude anyone earning less than $2,500 (in $2000) when we estimate the to-
bit equations.
Each of ﬁgures 8.2 through 8.4 shows a diﬀerent part of the distribution
of age-earnings proﬁle for three diﬀerent education subgroups: less than
high school, high school and some college, and college and beyond, after
we correct for top-coding. The median earnings path, displayed in ﬁgure
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Fig. 8.2 25th percentile earnings, after top-coding correction, HRS husbands
Fig. 8.3 50th percentile earnings, after top-coding correction, HRS husbands8.3, shows an unusual “bump” in early middle age. This appears to be due
to the top-coding adjustment for years in which an especially high fraction
of workers were aﬀected by the taxable earnings cap. However, this unusual
pattern does not appear at the 25th or 75th percentiles, nor does it occur
when we plot the means of the adjusted earnings histories. We suspect that
this is because there is less variation over time in the fraction of workers
aﬀected by the tax cap at these percentiles than at the median. These ﬁg-
ures show only the husband’s earnings trajectory. We perform the same
procedure for their spouses and use the imputed value of total household
earnings in our simulations.
Our approach to addressing top-coding is only one of several possible
approaches. Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006) develop an alterna-
tive algorithm that exploits the intertemporal dependence of earnings as
well as distributional assumptions to adjust top-coded earnings records.
They estimate cross-sectional wage equations using Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (IRS) W-2 wage reports as well as SSA earnings records, and then they
back-cast the residual from the years with W-2 data to adjust the SSA earn-
ings data for earlier years. Because HRS respondents fall in a relatively
narrow age range, however, this procedure essentially uses the serial corre-
lation structure from earnings in a later period of life, the period covered
by W-2 earnings, to describe the serial correlation structure earlier in life.
It is diﬃcult to evaluate the accuracy of this assumption.
We consider our sample households as reaching retirement age when the
husband is sixty-three years old. When we turn to the HRS data, however,
we assume that both sixty-three- and sixty-four-year-olds in a given survey
Reducing Social Security PRA Risk at the Individual Level 267
Fig. 8.4 75th percentile earnings, after top-coding correction, HRS husbandswave represent the “retiring” cohort because the HRS is carried out ever
other year. We need to determine non-PRA wealth at retirement age, and
the way we do this depends on the household’s age. First, we consider
wealth measurement for the nearly three-quarters of the sample with a
household head who was either sixty-three or sixty-four in 1996, 1998, or
2000. For these households, a breakdown of nonpension wealth is avail-
able on a consistent basis in HRS waves 3, 4, and 5. We scale all household
non-PRA asset values to the 2000 base year so that for each household we
have an estimate of what their non-PRA wealth would have been had they
turned age sixty-three in either 1999 or 2000. We implement this scaling by
replacing the nominal returns on asset holdings for the two years prior to
the year in which the head of household was either sixty-three or sixty-four,
that is, 1994 to 1995 for the 1996 households and 1996 to 1997 for the 1998
households, with nominal returns on assets in 1998 and 1999. We calibrate
our simulations using a measure of background wealth that includes only
ﬁnancial wealth, which is assumed to grow at a composite rate based on the
national average allocation of tax-deferred ﬁnancial assets between stocks,
bonds, and deposits, as reported in the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances.
Second, we consider wealth measurement for the one-quarter of the
sample that reached the age sixty-four prior to 1996. We do not use the ear-
lier waves of the HRS because the wealth questionnaire for waves 1 and 2
was diﬀerent from that for later waves. Wealth values for these HRS house-
holds are imputed for each asset class based on the median measured asset
growth for households between the ages of sixty-three and sixty-ﬁve, or
sixty-three and sixty-seven, in the same educational category in later waves
of the HRS.
Table 8.3presents summary statistics on our estimates of household bal-
ance sheets normalized to age sixty-three to sixty-four. We report seven
categories of wealth: the present discounted value (PDV) of Social Secu-
rity payments, the PDV of deﬁned beneﬁt pensions, the PDV of other an-
nuities, the current value of retirement accounts, the value of all other ﬁ-
nancial wealth net of debt, housing equity net of debt, and all other wealth.
The top panel in table 8.3 shows medians, while the bottom panel shows
means. The restriction to couples clearly raises the mean and median of the
distribution. The restriction to households in the age range sixty-three to
seventy-two, with full earnings histories to age sixty-three, lowers the
wealth distribution somewhat by removing a group that has not yet begun
to spend down their assets. The ﬁnal sample of couples aged sixty-three to
seventy-two has median wealth of $536,800 and mean wealth of $783,400.
The median high school-educated household has 44 percent more total
wealth than the median household with less than a high school education,
and the median college-educated household has 61 percent more total
wealth than the median high school-educated household. The diﬀerences
in means are even more dramatic. In this table, to estimate deﬁned beneﬁt































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.and DC pension wealth for HRS households, we use HRS pension wealth
imputations, version 1.0, March 2005. For Social Security wealth (SSW),
we follow the procedure from PRVW (2005), using cohort mortality tables
and the Social Security Administration’s intermediate-cost scenario dis-
count rates to calculate the PDV of the current or projected Social Security
beneﬁts when the husband is aged sixty-three to sixty-four. We normalize
the value of the wife’s Social Security to be the value when the husband is
aged sixty-three to sixty-four, assuming that Social Security payments start
for the wife at age sixty-two if they have not started already. The present
value of Social Security is determined as a joint survivor annuity.
When we calibrate our simulations with households’ non-PRA wealth,
we focus on the total of annuity wealth and other (i.e., nonretirement) ﬁ-
nancial wealth. We exclude housing wealth because it is not clear whether
it should be viewed as a source of retirement wealth for elderly households.
Venti and Wise (2004) report that elderly households rarely draw down
their housing wealth, which argues against including this wealth as a
source of retirement income. We also exclude deﬁned beneﬁt pension
wealth, 401(k) wealth, and Social Security wealth as we are assuming that
the PRA system we are simulating would replace those systems entirely. We
view our simulations as delivering the value of DC assets that households
accumulate by their retirement date. If we attributed existing 401(k) assets
to these households, the amount of DC wealth that households would ac-
cumulate would be much greater than the amount that we report in our
simulations.
By using the observed values of these wealth components from the HRS
and treating them as nonrandom when we evaluate the expected utility of
PRA retirement balances, we are implicitly assuming that changes in PRA
wealth values do not aﬀect other components of wealth. We hope to extend
our analysis to allow for correlation between the returns on assets in PRA
accounts and the returns on other household assets.
Table 8.4 disaggregates the household balance sheet aggregates by edu-
cation level. The table underscores the substantial diﬀerences across
households both within education categories and across these categories.
The diﬀerence at most percentiles between the total wealth of a household
that did not complete high school and one that completed college is a fac-
tor of at least two. The diﬀerence in annuities and other wealth, which we
use as our primary measure of non-PRA background wealth, is substan-
tially larger because this aggregate does not consider wealth from the cur-
rent progressive Social Security system. At the 60th percentile, a house-
hold with less than high school education has $6,400 in annuity and other
ﬁnancial wealth, whereas a household with a college or postgraduate edu-
cation has $183,000.
We assume that the three primary assets that households may hold in
a PRA are corporate stock, nominal long-term government bonds, and
Reducing Social Security PRA Risk at the Individual Level 271inﬂation-indexed long-term bonds (Treasury inﬂation-protected securities
[TIPS]). Calibrating the returns on these investment alternatives is a criti-
cal step in our simulation algorithm. We assume that PRA investors hold
corporate stocks through portfolios of large capitalization U.S. stocks. We
do not address the possibility of poorly diversiﬁed portfolios, for example,
with concentrated holdings in a single stock, as described in Munnell and
Sunden (2004) and Poterba (2003). We assume that the return distribution
for each asset class is given by Ibbotson Associates’ (2003) empirical dis-
tribution of returns during the 1926 to 2003 period. The average annual
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Table 8.4 Distribution of household balance sheet for Household and Retirement
Survey (HRS) couples with husbands aged 63–72, normalized to age
63/64 in year 2000
All  Less than High school  College 
education high school and/or some  and/or 
Net worth concept levels degree college postgraduate
20th percentile
Total 302.0 220.9 315.1 448.1
Total excluding 
retirement accounts 292.2 216.8 312.2 387.8
SS   DB   Annuity 189.8 169.4 198.8 204.6
Annuities and other 
ﬁnancial wealth 1.0 0.0 1.7 30.0
40th percentile
Total 450.1 323.2 450.4 707.9
Total excluding 
retirement accounts 419.1 314.1 423.6 607.8
SS   DB   Annuity 257.0 230.7 257.3 281.2
Annuities and other
ﬁnancial wealth 29.7 2.0 30.0 113.0
60th percentile
Total 637.4 441.3 622.1 1051.1
Total excluding 
retirement accounts 575.3 413.6 549.8 878.6
SS   DB   Annuity 295.6 265.7 296.1 338.0
Annuities and other 
ﬁnancial wealth 62.3 6.4 58.7 183.0
80th percentile
Total 994.5 644.1 866.4 1598.6
Total excluding 
retirement accounts 830.4 575.4 745.2 1229.6
SS   DB   Annuity 362.8 313.7 354.3 449.3
Annuities and other 
ﬁnancial wealth 273.5 121.0 235.5 600.0
Source: Authors’ tabulations from the 2000 HRS. Deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pension wealth was
calculated from the pension wealth imputations from the HRS (March 2005 version). Social
Security and annuity wealth were computed as in PRVW (2005).arithmetic real return on large capitalization U.S. equities during this pe-
riod was 9.2 percent, and the annual standard deviation of the real return
was 20.5 percent. Long-term U.S. government bonds had a real return of
2.8 percent, on average, over this period, and a standard deviation of 10.5
percent.
We assume that TIPS oﬀer a certain real return of 2 percent per year, ap-
proximately the current TIPS yield. Index bonds deliver a net-of-inﬂation
certain return only if the investor holds the bonds to maturity, and selling
the bonds before maturity exposes the investors to asset price risk. We nev-
ertheless treat these bonds as riskless long-term investment vehicles. In
oursimulations, when we draw returns from the stock and bond return dis-
tributions for a given iteration, we draw returns for the same year from
both distributions. This preserves the historical contemporary correlation
structure between stock and bond returns in our simulations.
Several analysts suggest that the last several decades, or even the last
century, correspond to a particularly favorable time period for equities and
argue that these returns should not be extrapolated to the future. The aca-
demic literature on the equity premium puzzle, summarized, for example,
in Mehra and Prescott (2002), raises the possibility that ex post returns ex-
ceeded ex ante expected returns over this period. To allow for such a pos-
sibility, we perform some simulations in which the distribution of returns
from which we draw is the actual distribution except that equity returns are
reduced by 300 basis points in each year. Comparing these simulations
with those in our baseline indicates the sensitivity of our ﬁndings to the fu-
ture pattern of equity returns.
Each iteration of our simulation algorithm involves drawing a sequence
of thirty-ﬁve real stock and bond returns from the empirical return distri-
bution. The draws are done with replacement, and we assume that there is
no serial correlation in returns. We then use this return sequence to calcu-
late the real value of each household’s retirement account balance at age
sixty-three under the diﬀerent asset allocation strategies. For each of the
1,400 households in our sample, we simulate the PRA balance at age sixty-
three 5,000 times. We then summarize these 5,000 outcomes either with a
distribution of wealth values at retirement or by calculating the expected
utility associated with this distribution of outcomes. We found in PRVW
(2005) that roughly this number of iterations was needed to obtain robust
ﬁndings, particularly at lower percentiles of the retirement wealth distri-
bution.
8.4 Discussion of Results
We simulate eight primary asset allocation strategies for the household’s
PRA account. The ﬁrst three involve investing in only one asset: (1) a port-
folio that is fully invested in TIPS; (2) a portfolio that is fully invested in
Reducing Social Security PRA Risk at the Individual Level 273long-term government bonds, and (3) a portfolio that is fully invested in
corporate stock. The next two portfolios are “heuristic portfolios” that use
simple rules for life-cycle asset allocation. Portfolio (4) holds (110—age of
household head) percent of the portfolio in stock, with the remaining bal-
ance in TIPS. Portfolio (5) is similar to (4) except that nominal government
bonds replace TIPS for the component of the portfolio that is not held in
equity. Both of these portfolios are rebalanced at the end of each period.
The next two are life-cycle portfolios consisting of stocks and TIPS, and
stocks and government bonds, respectively. The equity weight for each of
these funds is computed based on the average of the age-speciﬁc alloca-
tions in the life-cycle funds at Fidelity, Vanguard, T. Rowe Price, Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund
(TIAA-CREF); Principal, Barclays, and Wells Fargo. The life-cycle funds
from these fund families are weighted equally in this calculation, and the
resulting equity allocation is similar to that in table 8.1. Portfolio (6) invests
the life-cycle fund average in equities and the balance in TIPS, while fund
(7) holds equities and nominal government bonds in the life-cycle mix.
The ﬁnal primary investment strategy we consider, strategy (8), is the
“No Lose” strategy that Feldstein (2005) proposes in his analysis of indi-
vidual account Social Security reforms. At each age, we calculate the share
of the household’s PRA contribution that would have to be invested in
TIPS to guarantee at least the contributed amount in nominal terms at 
retirement age. The required TIPS investment is (1   RTIPS)–(63–a), where 
63 – a is the number of years to retirement. This strategy is fundamentally
diﬀerent from the other life-cycle strategies because it does not involve
portfolio rebalancing at each age. Instead, the equity share of the portfolio
depends on the historical pattern of TIPS yields, which in turn determine
the amount available for stock investment in past years, and on the histor-
ical returns on equity assets.
In addition to these eight strategies, we also consider optimized portfo-
lio strategies that are each derived from running multiple simulations of a
given form and then selecting the optimal investment strategies from
among them for a given level of risk aversion, asset class, and asset return
assumption. The ﬁrst of these is an optimal ﬁxed portfolio strategy, in
which we examine the outcome of investing X percent in stocks and 1 – X
percent in TIPS at 5 percent intervals. The second is an optimal “linear”
life-cycle strategy, in which we consider strategies that begin at X percent
at age twenty-eight and end at 1 – X percent at age sixty-three. This is, of
course, a restricted class of life-cycle portfolios but serves as a useful point
of comparison for the commercially available products. The optimization
is performed separately for each level of risk aversion, asset class, and as-
set return assumption. We describe this in greater detail in the following.
We assume that the returns on PRA investments equal the pretax returns
on the various asset classes we consider, less the expense charge for invest-
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assumptions: a baseline assumption and a high-expense assumption. Our
baseline assumption for equity mutual funds is a 32 basis point expense ra-
tio, the weighted mean expense ratio on S&P 500 index funds reported in
Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004). Given that government bond funds tend to
have similar expense ratios to stock index funds, we assume 32 basis points
as the expense ratio for government bond funds. For TIPS, we use an ex-
pense ratio of 40 basis points, on the grounds that these funds may be 20
percent more expensive than typical stock or bond index funds. Our high-
expense assumption is 100 basis points for stock and bond funds. Expense
ratios this high are not uncommon.
For the cost of investing in life-cycle products, we consider three possi-
bilities. The baseline assumption we make is that the life-cycle product car-
ries an expense ratio of 40 basis points, with investors paying a relatively
small cost (8 basis points) for the automatic rebalancing. Based on the ex-
pense ratios in table 8.1, however, this baseline assumption is probably too
low relative to what individuals investing in this market actually pay. We,
therefore, also run simulations with the asset-weighted average expense ra-
tio from table 8.1 of 74 basis points and for a high-expense scenario of 120
basis points.
8.4.1 The Distribution of Retirement Wealth
Table 8.5 shows the distribution of PRA balances in thousands of year
2000 dollars averaged across the 1,400 households in our sample, for each
of the ﬁrst eight strategies and assuming the baseline expense ratios. In the
left-most panel, the simulations use the historical distribution of returns.
The panel on the right reduces equity returns by 300 basis points. House-
holds are stratiﬁed by education group within each panel. The table reports
the mean wealth at retirement for each strategy, as well as 4 points in the
distribution of returns. Because our interest is the comparison of wealth
outcomes across diﬀerent strategies, most of our following discussion fo-
cuses on a single education group, households headed by someone with a
high school degree but not a college degree. The relative ranking of diﬀer-
ent strategies is similar for other education groups.
The ﬁrst row of table 8.5 provides a point of reference for all of the sub-
sequent calculations. It shows the certain wealth at retirement associated
with strategy (1), holding only TIPS. For those with a high school degree
and/or some college, this leads to a retirement balance of $236,700. The
next panels show the results from strategy (2), holding on nominal govern-
ment bonds, and strategy (3), holding only corporate stocks. Both of these
strategies, as well as all of the subsequent strategies that we consider, in-
volve risk so we report information on the distribution of outcomes.
The second panel shows that for a household with a high school degree
or some college, holding only government bonds leads to a higher average
Reducing Social Security PRA Risk at the Individual Level 275Table 8.5 Simulated distribution of 401(k) balances at retirement ($2000), baseline
expense ratios
Empirical returns
reduced 300 basis points Empirical stock returns
Less High  Less High
than school than school
Investment high and/or College high and/or College
strategy/ school some and/or school some and/or
percentile degree college postgraduate degree college postgraduate
100% TIPS 167.4 236.7 325.5 167.4 236.7 325.5
100% government bonds
1 53.8 76.4 110.0 53.8 76.4 110.0
10 113.6 160.5 224.5 113.6 160.5 224.5
50 182.3 258.0 352.9 182.3 258.0 352.9
90 307.6 435.6 582.9 307.6 435.6 582.9
Mean 200.1 283.2 385.0 200.1 283.2 385.0
100% stocks
1 30.9 44.3 62.4 19.0 27.2 40.1
10 186.3 265.1 355.0 101.5 143.7 200.2
50 553.5 790.4 1016.5 285.4 404.7 539.8
90 1,699.7 2,446.7 3,039.1 845.0 1,205.7 1,546.7
Mean 813.1 1,169.3 1,470.4 410.5 585.5 761.7
(110   age)% stocks, (age   10)% TIPS
1 80.0 113.6 156.9 63.0 89.4 125.3
10 183.4 259.9 352.1 142.8 202.2 277.6
50 289.5 410.3 548.4 224.6 317.8 430.3
90 454.7 645.0 851.6 351.7 498.0 665.4
Mean 307.7 436.2 581.3 238.5 337.7 455.7
(110   age)% stocks, (age   10)% bonds
1 62.4 87.7 122.7 49.6 69.8 99.1
10 171.1 242.6 329.9 133.5 189.1 260.7
50 308.0 436.8 581.7 238.5 337.7 455.4
90 561.2 797.7 1,041.2 431.8 612.6 809.1
Mean 344.3 488.9 646.60 266.0 377.2 505.1
Empirical life cycle, stocks and TIPS
1 70.7 101.0 142.5 53.6 76.4 110.5
10 184.2 261.3 353.8 131.4 185.9 258.2
50 329.8 469.8 615.6 227.7 322.8 434.3
90 611.0 876.3 1,114.7 409.9 584.0 761.7
Mean 372.4 532.2 690.0 254.7 362.0 481.7
Empirical life cycle, stocks and bonds
1 58.6 82.6 116.1 44.4 62.7 90.4
10 174.4 247.7 335.2 124.3 176.0 244.4
50 342.3 487.9 638.7 236.1 334.8 449.8
90 697.6 1,000.8 1,270.2 467.6 666.7 867.2
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Table 8.5 (continued)
Empirical returns
reduced 300 basis points Empirical stock returns
Less High  Less High
than school than school
Investment high and/or College high and/or College
strategy/ school some and/or school some and/or
percentile degree college postgraduate degree college postgraduate
Feldstein (2005) “No Lose” plan
1 123.6 174.6 245.5 120.3 169.7 239.4
10 175.5 248.9 339.0 145.1 204.9 285.0
50 314.0 448.9 581.6 209.8 297.6 400.4
90 774.2 1,120.6 1,379.3 424.0 607.4 776.1
Mean 421.9 607.8 768.0 260.0 370.9 487.8
Source: Authors’ tabulations of simulation results. See text for further details.
Note: TIPS   Treasury inﬂation-protected securities.
retirement wealth, $283,200, than holding TIPS. The average wealth at re-
tirement is nearly 20 percent greater than the value with TIPS, but the me-
dian wealth of $265,100 is less than 10 percent above the TIPS outcome.
Moreover, there are many outcomes with retirement wealth values below
the TIPS case. The 10th percentile outcome is $160,500, and the 1st per-
centile is $76,400.
When the PRA is invested in corporate stock, the average retirement bal-
ance is much higher than that with either TIPS or nominal government
bonds: $1,169,300. This value is roughly four times greater than the out-
come with nominal government bonds. Because the mean return on stocks
is so much higher than that on either nominal or inﬂation-indexed bonds,
even the low outcomes are often above the mean outcomes with bonds. The
10th percentile retirement wealth value with the all-stocks portfolio is not
far below average outcome with a nominal government bond portfolio.
The 1st percentile outcome, however, $44,300, is below the correspond-
ingly low outcomes for the nominal bonds strategy.
The next two portfolios, (4) and (5), are “heuristic” life-cycle investment
strategies with a mix of stocks and TIPS, or stocks and long-term nominal
government bonds. In both cases, the average value of retirement wealth
falls between the value with an all-stock investment and that with an all-
bond portfolio. When the nominal government bond share of the portfolio
is (age   10) percent, the average value of retirement wealth using histori-
cal equity returns is $488,900 for a household with a high school education.
The proportional dispersion in the retirement wealth value is smaller than
that for an all equity portfolio and greater than that for the bond portfolio.
The diﬀerence between the 90th percentile and the 10th percentile retire-
ment wealth value with an all-stock strategy is 1.87 times the mean value,and the corresponding measure for the all-bond portfolio is 0.97. With the
nominal bond-stock heuristic life-cycle portfolio, the 90-10 spread is 1.14
times the mean outcome. The 1st percentile outcomes with the two heuris-
tic life-cycle portfolios are $113,600 and $87,700, both larger than 1st per-
centile outcomes with either the all-stock or all-bond portfolios.
The next two portfolios, (6) and (7), are the life-cycle portfolios that
correspond to the average of the portfolios from various mutual fund
complexes. While the age-speciﬁc equity allocation is somewhat diﬀerent
from the foregoing heuristic portfolios, the distribution of PRA wealth at
retirement is similar. In particular, the mean value of retirement wealth is
$532,200 when we combine TIPS and stocks, and $574,500 when we com-
bine nominal long-term government bonds and stocks. The diﬀerence is
due to TIPS oﬀering a lower real yield than the historical average real re-
turn on nominal bonds during our sample period. The 1st percentile out-
come when we combine TIPS with stocks is lower than that of the heuris-
tic strategy with TIPS and stocks. Similarly, the 1st percentile outcome
of the bonds-stocks mutual fund product is lower than that of the heuris-
tic strategy with TIPS and bonds. The empirical life-cycle products are
therefore higher mean but also somewhat riskier than the heuristic strate-
gies.
The eighth and last strategy in this table is the Feldstein (2005) No Lose
plan. This strategy oﬀers a mean return that is broadly similar to the mean
returns on the life-cycle strategies. The mean retirement wealth for a high
school educated household is $607,800, which is between the mean wealth
values with a life-cycle fund that holds TIPS and one that holds nominal
government bonds. The important diﬀerence among this strategy and the
life-cycle strategies and the all-stocks and all-nominal bonds strategies is
found in the lower tail of the wealth outcomes. Because the No Lose strat-
egy holds TIPS, the 1st percentile wealth value is $174,600, greater than
any of the strategies other than investing 100 percent in TIPS.
The assumption that the equity return is drawn from its historical distri-
bution is important for the absolute level of retirement wealth under most
of the strategies that we consider and also for the magnitude of the diﬀer-
ences across strategies. The fourth, ﬁfth, and sixth columns in table 8.5
present results assuming that equity returns are reduced by 300 basis
points. The all-stock strategy is the one that is most aﬀected by this change.
The average wealth at retirement for this strategy falls from $1,169,300 to
$585,500. The 10th percentile wealth value drops from $265,100 to
$143,700 in this case, and the 1st percentile value drops to $44,300 from
$27,200. This very low outcome emphasizes the risk associated with hold-
ing stocks: a very small chance of a very poor outcome. The average retire-
ment wealth values for the various heuristic and empirical life-cycle funds
decline when we reduce the value of the mean equity return. The mean
wealth value for the No Lose strategy falls relative to the life-cycle strate-
278 James M. Poterba, Joshua Rauh, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wisegies because the No Lose strategy has relatively more equity exposure than
any of the life-cycle plans.
The distribution of retirement balances shown in table 8.5 is conceptu-
ally similar to the distribution reported in Shiller’s (2005) analysis of per-
sonal accounts Social Security reform, although there are diﬀerences in the
simulation procedure that aﬀect the results. The most important diﬀerence
is that Shiller (2005) uses data on stock and bond returns from a longer
time period than we consider. This means that he assumes a distribution of
equity returns with a lower mean value than the mean of the distribution
we consider. Our results when the average return on stocks is set at 300 ba-
sis points below the historical mean in our sample are closer to those in
Shiller (2005) than our results that assume that returns are drawn from the
actual return distribution for 1926–2002.
Table 8.6 shows the distributions of outcomes from table 8.5 but under
the higher expense ratio scenario (100 basis points for stocks and bonds,
120 basis points for the life-cycle products). This table demonstrates the
detrimental eﬀects of high expense ratios on retirement wealth accumula-
tion. The outcomes are 7 to 15 percent lower than under the baseline ex-
pense ratio scenario.
8.4.2 Expected Utility of Retirement Wealth
Results like those in table 8.5 and 8.6 do not provide any information on
the household utility associated with a particular retirement wealth out-
come. To address this issue, we evaluate the expected utility associated with
various wealth outcomes from our simulation runs, using the procedure
described in equation (5). We focus in this analysis on CRRA parameters
of 2 and 4.
We ﬁrst calculate for each education category (less than high school,
high school and/or some college, college and/or postgraduate), risk aver-
sion (2 and 4), return assumption (empirical and 300 basis points reduced),
and non-PRA wealth assumption (none and annuity plus other ﬁnancial
wealth) an “optimal” ﬁxed proportions strategy and “optimal” linear life-
cycle strategy. This is done by searching over grids at 5 percent intervals.
For example, in ﬁnding the optimal ﬁxed proportions we start with 100
percent stocks and 0 percent TIPS, then simulate 95 percent stocks and 5
percent TIPS, and so on until we get to 5 percent stocks and 95 percent
TIPS. In ﬁnding the optimal linear life-cycle portfolio, we start with a strat-
egy that begins 100 percent in stocks and declines linearly to 0 percent in
stocks with the rest of the allocation going to TIPS. We then simulate a
strategy that begins 95 percent in stocks and declines linearly to 5 percent,
and so on, until we get to 55 percent stocks declining to 45 percent stocks.
We calculate these using the baseline expense ratios, and we assume that in-
dividuals pay the baseline expense ratios for the stock and TIPS funds (32
and 40 basis points, respectively).
Reducing Social Security PRA Risk at the Individual Level 279Table 8.6 Simulated distribution of 401(k) balances at retirement ($2000), higher
expense ratios
Empirical returns
reduced 300 basis points Empirical stock returns
Less High Less High 
than school than school 
Investment high and/or College high and/or College 
strategy/ school some and/or school some and/or 
percentile degree college postgraduate degree college postgraduate
100% TIPS 148.9 210.3 291.6 148.9 210.3 291.6
100% government bonds
1 48.1 68.2 99.1 48.1 68.2 99.1
10 100.0 141.2 199.3 100.0 141.2 199.3
50 159.3 225.3 310.9 159.3 225.3 310.9
90 267.1 377.7 509.9 267.1 377.7 509.9
Mean 174.5 246.8 338.5 174.5 246.8 338.5
100% stocks
1 27.5 39.5 56.1 17.1 24.6 36.5
10 161.5 229.5 310.1 89.2 126.2 177.4
50 474.4 676.4 876.9 247.2 350.2 471.2
90 1,446.5 2,078.4 2,599.4 724.5 1,031.8 1,333.3
Mean 694.3 996.5 1,262.2 353.5 503.4 660.3
(110   age)% stocks, (age   10)% TIPS
1 70.8 100.6 140.0 56.0 79.5 112.4
10 161.2 228.3 311.8 126.0 178.3 246.9
50 253.8 359.2 484.0 197.5 279.2 381.2
90 397.7 563.3 749.4 308.4 436.2 587.5
Mean 269.6 381.7 512.7 209.6 296.5 403.3
(110   age)% stocks, (age   10)% bonds
1 55.1 77.5 109.5 44.0 62.0 88.8
10 149.2 211.3 290.0 117.0 165.5 230.2
50 267.0 378.2 507.9 207.5 293.5 399.3
90 484.2 687.0 904.0 373.6 529.3 704.9
Mean 298.0 422.5 563.6 231.1 327.2 442.0
Empirical life cycle, stocks and TIPS
1 64.8 92.5 131.5 49.5 70.5 102.6
10 166.4 235.9 321.4 119.5 169.0 236.2
50 295.6 420.6 554.7 205.4 290.8 393.9
90 544.2 779.3 997.2 366.9 522.1 685.3
Mean 333.1 475.4 620.3 229.1 325.3 435.8
Empirical life cycle, stocks and bonds
1 53.7 75.8 107.2 41.0 57.9 84.0
10 157.5 223.5 304.4 113.0 159.9 223.5
50 306.8 436.7 575.2 212.8 301.5 407.7
90 621.2 890.0 1,136.1 418.5 595.9 779.9
Mean 359.2 513.0 667.1 246.4 350.0 467.2Table 8.7 shows the strategies that yield the highest expected utility for
each set of characteristics. When there is no other wealth, risk aversion of
2, and historical empirical stock returns, the optimal ﬁxed proportions
strategy is 100 percent stocks and 0 percent TIPS for all education cate-
gories. Under the lower returns assumption, the optimal ﬁxed proportion
is 65 percent stocks and 35 percent TIPS for the lower two education cate-
gories, and 70 percent stocks and 30 percent TIPS for the college or more
category. With risk aversion of 4, the optimal ﬁxed proportion declines to
55 to 60 percent in stocks under the historical empirical distribution and
35 percent in stocks under the reduced return assumption. When there is
other wealth of annuities and other ﬁnancial assets, the optimal ﬁxed pro-
portion allocation varies from 40 percent to 100 percent depending on the
education level, return assumption, and risk aversion. Lower optimal eq-
uity shares are associated with the lower return assumption, the lower lev-
els of education, and the higher levels of risk aversion. The education pat-
terns reﬂect the fact that lower-education households typically have much
less non-PRA wealth than higher-education households. If alpha is 0 or 1
(not shown in the table), the optimal ﬁxed proportion is always 100 percent
stocks.
The optimal linear life-cycle strategy among the class of strategies we
simulate is in many cases the one with the ﬂattest proﬁle. However, a pro-
ﬁle that begins 60 to 65 percent in stocks and declines linearly to 40 to 35
percent in stocks is optimal among the class of linear life-cycle portfolios
for couples with risk aversion of 4, no other wealth, and facing the histor-
ical distribution of equity returns. A more downward-sloping proﬁle that
begins 80 percent in stocks and declines linearly to 20 percent in stocks is
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Table 8.6 (continued)
Empirical returns
reduced 300 basis points Empirical stock returns
Less High Less High 
than school than school 
Investment high and/or College high and/or College 
strategy/ school some and/or school some and/or 
percentile degree college postgraduate degree college postgraduate
Feldstein (2005) “No Lose” plan
1 110.8 156.4 221.7 108.0 152.3 216.5
10 154.6 219.0 300.9 129.0 182.1 255.4
50 271.0 386.7 505.5 183.7 260.2 353.2
90 657.5 949.9 1,177.6 364.1 520.6 670.7
Mean 361.6 520.0 662.5 225.9 321.7 427.0
Source: Authors’ tabulations of simulation results. See text for further details.
Note: TIPS   Treasury inﬂation-protected securities.optimal for households with risk aversion of 4, no other wealth, and facing
the reduced equity returns. In general, lower returns and higher risk aver-
sion are correlated with a greater shift from stocks toward TIPS as the in-
dividual ages.
Table 8.8 shows the expected utility generated by the distribution of re-
tirement resources for each of the eight primary portfolio strategies, as well
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Table 8.7 Optimal asset allocations calculations (5% grid)
Empirical stock returns 
reduced 300 basis points (%) Empirical stock returns (%)
Less High Less High 
than school  than school 
high and/or  College  high and/or  College 
school some  and/or  school some  and/or 
degree college postgraduate degree college postgraduate
No other wealth
alpha   2
Optimal ﬁxed  `
proportions: 
% stocks (rest TIPS) 100 100 100 65 65 70
Optimal linear 
life cycle: 
starting % stocks 55 55 55 55 55 55
alpha   4
Optimal ﬁxed 
proportions: 
% stocks (rest TIPS) 55 55 60 35 35 35
Optimal linear 
life cycle: 
starting % stocks 65 65 60 80 80 80
Annuities and other ﬁnancial wealth
alpha   2
Optimal ﬁxed 
proportions: 
% stocks (rest TIPS) 100 100 100 80 85 100
Optimal linear 
life cycle: 
starting % stocks 55 55 55 55 55 55
alpha   4
Optimal ﬁxed 
proportions: 
% stocks (rest TIPS) 70 75 90 40 45 55
Optimal linear 
life cycle: 
starting % stocks 55 55 55 75 70 65
Note: TIPS   Treasury inﬂation-protected securities.Table 8.8 Certainty equivalent wealth ($2000) for diﬀerent asset allocation rules and
diﬀerent expected stock returns, no other wealth
Empirical stock returns
reduced 300 basis points Empirical stock returns
Less High Less  High 
than school than  school 
Investment high and/or College  high and/or  College 
strategy/risk school some and/or school some  and/or 
aversion degree college postgraduate degree college postgraduate
alpha   2
Baseline expense ratios
100% TIPS 167.4 236.7 325.5
100% government bonds 171.9 242.9 334.3
100% stocks 389.1 553.7 731.0 207.9 294.5 403.3
Heuristic:
(110   age)% stocks,
rest TIPS 271.5 384.8 516.4 210.8 298.4 405.7
Heuristic:
(110   age)% stocks, 
rest bonds 278.0 393.9 528.7 215.8 305.5 415.3
Empirical life cycle, 
stocks  and TIPS 322.5 458.9 605.5 224.4 317.9 430.2
Empirical life  cycle, 
stocks and bonds 323.5 460.3 607.9 225.2 319.0 432.1
Feldstein 
“No Lose” plan 297.1 423.5 557.5 212.7 301.6 407.8
Optimal ﬁxed 
proportions (stocks 
and TIPS) 389.1 553.7 731.0 224.2 317.6 430.8
Optimal linear life cycle 298.4 423.9 562.8 220.1 311.7 421.9
Average expense ratios
Empirical life cycle, 
stocks and TIPS 299.1 425.3 563.6 209.0 295.8 402.1
Empirical life cycle, 
stocks and bonds 300.0 426.6 565.8 209.7 297.0 403.9
High expense ratios
100% TIPS 148.9 210.3 291.6
100% government bonds 150.5 212.7 295.1
100% stocks 335.9 477.7 635.1 181.6 257.2 354.7
Empirical life cycle, 
stocks and TIPS 268.8 381.9 509.0 189.0 267.3 365.5
Empirical life cycle, 
stocks and bonds 269.7 383.1 511.0 189.7 268.4 367.2
Feldstein 
“No Lose” plan 258.4 367.7 487.8 186.9 264.6 360.7
(continued)Table 8.8 (continued)
Empirical stock returns
reduced 300 basis points Empirical stock returns
Less High Less  High 
than school than  school 
Investment high and/or College  high and/or  College 
strategy/risk school some and/or school some  and/or 
aversion degree college postgraduate degree college postgraduate
alpha   4
Baseline expense ratios
100% TIPS 167.4 236.7 325.5
100% government bonds 150.0 211.8 294.9
100% stocks 204.2 288.3 398.1 116.3 164.2 234.5
Heuristic: 
(110   age)% stocks, 
rest TIPS 239.4 339.1 458.3 186.3 263.6 361.0
Heuristic: 
(110   age)% stocks, 
rest bonds 226.2 320.2 435.5 176.6 249.8 344.1
Empirical life cycle, 
stocks and TIPS 263.1 372.6 501.7 186.8 263.8 363.9
Empirical life cycle, 
stocks and bonds 247.5 350.6 473.8 176.5 249.3 345.0
Feldstein 
“No Lose” plan 245.8 348.7 468.9 191.2 270.4 370.3
Optimal ﬁxed 
proportions (stocks  0
and TIPS) 256.3 363.5 490.1 193.8 274.3 374.6
Optimal linear life cycle 256.7 364.1 489.1 197.3 278.9 381.3
Average expense ratios
Empirical life cycle, 
stocks and TIPS 244.8 346.6 468.6 174.6 246.4 341.3
Empirical life cycle, 
stocks and bonds 230.5 326.3 442.8 165.0 233.0 323.9
High expense ratios
100% TIPS 148.9 210.3 291.6
100% government bonds 131.9 186.2 261.3
100% stocks 178.3 252.9 351.3 102.9 145.8 209.7
Empirical life cycle, 
stocks and TIPS 221.0 312.9 425.4 158.6 223.9 311.8
Empirical life cycle, 
stocks and bonds 208.2 294.8 402.7 150.0 211.8 296.3
Feldstein 
“No Lose” plan 215.5 305.5 413.9 168.9 238.7 329.5
Source: Authors’ tabulations from simulation analysis. See text for further discussion.
Note: TIPS   Treasury inﬂation-protected securities.as the two derived optimal strategies, using a certainty equivalent wealth
measure to value the potential outcomes. In this table, we assume that the
PRA balance is the household’s only wealth. The values in the upper half
of table 8.8 are based on risk aversion of 2. This panel shows that under
the empirical stock return scenario, the 100 percent stocks strategy is the
best among all of the strategies that we simulated for households with this
level of risk aversion. The amount by which this strategy outperforms the
other strategies is rather considerable in the empirical return scenario. It
is roughly 20 percent greater than the empirical life-cycle strategies, as-
suming that investors can obtain the empirical life cycle for 40 basis points.
It is roughly 30 percent greater than the empirical life-cycle strategies un-
der the average expense ratio of 74 basis points. The certainty equivalent
for 100 percent stocks is at least 40 percent greater than the heuristic strate-
gies, and it is more than 120 percent better than the all bonds strategies.
When expense ratios are raised, the 100 percent stock allocation is still op-
timal (as the higher expense ratio scenario also involves higher expense ra-
tios for bonds and TIPS) but the household is 13 to 14 percent worse oﬀ.
When returns are reduced by 300 basis points, the 100 percent stock
strategy is no longer optimal. The empirical life-cycle strategy under the
baseline expense assumption (40 basis points) yields the best outcome. For
example, for a household with a high school education, the certainty equiv-
alent of the empirical life-cycle fund is $319,000, compared to $294,500
from investing entirely in stocks and $236,700 from investing entirely in
bonds. Note that the amount by which the best strategy outperforms the
next best alternative is smaller in both percentage terms and dollar terms
than the amount by which the stocks strategy outperformed in the empiri-
cal stock returns scenario. In particular, the best ﬁxed proportions strategy,
which table 8.7 found to be 65 percent stocks for the lower two education
categories and 70 percent stocks for the highest category, falls below the
best strategy by less than $2,000. The broad magnitudes of all of the strate-
gies that involve some equity investment are not far from the optimal strat-
egy. Obtaining reasonably low expense ratios is critical, however, as the av-
erage and high expense ratio simulations show that the household loses
substantial value relative to the baseline expense ratio certainty equiva-
lents. Certainty equivalents under the higher expense ratios are 10 to 15
percent lower than those under the baseline expense ratios. Furthermore,
the empirical life-cycle products are much less competitive when we con-
sider the premiums that investors generally pay in terms of expense ratios.
The lower panel of table 8.8 shows a similar analysis to the upper panel
but with a risk aversion of 4. Under the historical empirical distribution of
equity returns and baseline expense ratios, the empirical life cycle consist-
ing of stocks and TIPS generates the highest certainty equivalents relative
to the other strategies. However, this assumes that investors will not pay a
large premium in expenses for the life-cycle fund. The average expense ra-
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ear life-cycle or optimal ﬁxed proportions strategies because these are
achieved at lower cost (32 basis points when in stocks, 40 basis points when
in TIPS). Under the reduced equity return assumptions, the optimal linear
life-cycle strategy beats the other strategies assuming the baseline expense
ratios. When expense ratios are high, the Feldstein No Lose plan generates
higher certainty equivalents than the other strategies considered.
Although not shown here, we also conducted simulations with risk aver-
sion of 0 (linear utility) and risk aversion of 1 (log utility). In both of these
cases, 100 percent equity is always the optimal strategy. Risk aversion of 0
is equivalent to considering the mean returns from tables 8.5 and 8.6. The
log level of risk aversion reduces the certainty equivalent value of the all-
stock portfolio strategy relative to other strategies, but this strategy con-
tinues to generate the highest expected utility for all education groups. This
outcome obtains when the expected stock return is set equal to its histori-
cal average and when it is reduced by 300 basis points.
Table 8.8 considers the certainty equivalent of diﬀerent investment
strategies when retirement wealth from a PRA plan is the only source of
wealth at retirement. By assuming that the household is solely dependent
on PRA wealth, these calculations exaggerate the level of retirement in-
come risk faced by the household. Holding constant the household’s rela-
tive risk coeﬃcient, when the household has other sources of wealth, it will
behave as though it were less risk averse.
Table 8.9 presents results with the alternative assumptions about non-
PRA wealth at retirement, namely that it equals annuity and other ﬁnan-
cial wealth. The households in this case are less averse to holding high frac-
tions of their wealth in stocks. For a relative risk aversion of two, for
example, the certainty equivalent value of contributing to a PRA that is in-
vested in the empirical life-cycle fund at average expense ratios with stocks
and TIPS is $425,300 when households with a high school education have
no wealth at retirement other than their retirement wealth. This value can
be found in table 8.8. When other ﬁnancial wealth is combined with retire-
ment account wealth in determining the utility of retirement wealth, the
certainty equivalent of the same strategy rises to $442,100. These values
represent the certainty equivalent of just the PRA account balance. This is
the amount in addition to other wealth that would be needed to generate
the expected utility associated with the uncertain retirement wealth distri-
bution.
Allowing for nonretirement account wealth raises the attractiveness of
riskier strategies relative to other investment options. Under the empirical
returns scenario, the 100 percent stocks investment dominates when alpha
is 2, under both the baseline expense and higher expense ratio scenarios.
When returns are reduced, the optimal ﬁxed strategy generates the highest
certainty equivalent for the lower two education categories. As shown in
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diﬀerent expected stock returns, other wealth equal to annuities (excluding
deﬁned beneﬁt [DB] plans and Social Security) and non-retirement
ﬁnancial wealth
Empirical stock returns
reduced 300 basis points Empirical stock returns
Less High  Less High 
than school  than school 
Investment high and/or  College  high and/or  College 
strategy/risk school some  and/or  school some  and/or 
aversion degree college postgraduate degree college postgraduate
alpha   2
Baseline expense ratios
100% TIPS 167.4 236.7 325.5
100% government bonds 176.1 252.0 351.7
100% stocks 419.0 618.9 861.7 229.4 340.5 492.5
Heuristic: 
(110   age)% stocks, 
rest TIPS 275.9 394.3 535.4 214.8 306.9 422.2
Heuristic: 
(110   age)% stocks, 
rest bonds 285.5 410.2 560.9 222.5 319.9 443.1
Empirical life cycle, 
stocks and TIPS 330.4 476.4 639.3 230.7 331.6 456.0
Empirical life cycle,
stocks and bonds 334.2 483.7 653.5 233.8 337.7 467.5
Feldstein 
“No Lose” plan 306.2 443.8 597.0 217.3 311.6 426.8
Optimal ﬁxed 
proportions (stocks
and TIPS) 419.0 618.9 861.7 235.4 344.1 492.5
Optimal linear life cycle 304.0 436.1 586.9 224.8 321.9 441.6
Average expense ratios
Empirical life cycle,
stocks and TIPS 306.7 442.1 595.8 215.0 309.0 426.6
Empirical life cycle,  
stocks and bonds 310.3 449.1 609.3 217.9 314.7 437.6
High expense ratios
100% TIPS 148.9 210.3 291.6
100% government bonds 154.4 221.0 310.9
100% stocks 363.7 538.1 755.6 201.4 299.4 436.3
Empirical life cycle, 
stocks and TIPS 276.0 397.6 539.1 194.6 279.6 388.3
Empirical life cycle, 
stocks and bonds 279.3 404.3 551.8 197.3 285.0 398.5
Feldstein 
“No Lose” plan 266.8 386.2 523.5 191.0 273.7 377.7
(continued)Table 8.9 Certainty equivalent wealth ($2000) for diﬀerent asset allocation rules and
diﬀerent expected stock returns, other wealth equal to annuities (excluding
deﬁned beneﬁt [DB] plans and Social Security) and non-retirement
ﬁnancial wealth
Empirical stock returns
reduced 300 basis points Empirical stock returns
Less High  Less High 
than school  than school 
Investment high and/or  College  high and/or  College 
strategy/risk school some  and/or  school some  and/or 
aversion degree college postgraduate degree college postgraduate
alpha   4
Baseline expense ratios
100% TIPS 167.4 236.7 325.5
100% government bonds 157.6 227.9 325.5
100% stocks 250.0 387.1 593.0 148.4 232.1 365.9
Heuristic: 
(110   age)% stocks, 
rest TIPS 248.1 357.7 495.1 194.0 280.0 392.8
Heuristic:
(110   age)% stocks,
rest bonds 240.3 350.2 494.6 189.0 276.0 394.9
Empirical life  cycle, 
stocks and TIPS 277.3 404.0 561.8 198.0 288.2 409.7
Empirical life cycle, 
stocks and bonds 266.3 391.4 552.8 191.3 281.3 406.0
Feldstein 
“No Lose” plan 257.1 373.6 518.6 197.0 283.2 395.3
Optimal ﬁxed 
proportions (stocks 
and TIPS) 275.0 408.0 569.9 199.3 287.4 405.7
Optimal linear life cycle 266.8 386.3 533.3 203.0 291.8 407.0
Average expense ratios
Empirical life cycle, 
stocks and TIPS 258.5 376.6 525.7 185.3 269.7 384.7
Empirical life cycle, 
stocks and bonds 248.4 365.3 518.0 179.2 263.6 381.8
High expense ratios
100% TIPS 148.9 210.3 291.6
100% government bonds 138.8 201.0 289.1
100% stocks 220.8 343.7 529.7 132.5 208.0 329.5
Empirical life cycle, 
stocks and TIPS 233.8 340.9 478.6 168.6 245.5 352.1
Empirical life cycle, 
stocks and bonds 225.0 331.4 472.6 163.3 240.4 350.1
Feldstein 
“No Lose” plan 225.9 328.3 459.0 174.2 250.3 351.9
Source: Authors’ tabulations from simulation analysis. See text for further discussion.
Note: TIPS   Treasury inﬂation-protected securities.table 8.7, this strategy requires 80 percent and 85 percent in stocks,
respectively, for households with less than high school education and
households with a high school education. For the top education category,
the 100 percent equity strategy dominates. This is also the optimal ﬁxed-
proportions strategy.
When alpha is 4, the situation with baseline and average expense ratios
is similar to that when the household has no other wealth, in that the em-
pirical life-cycle portfolio is a good choice when it can be obtained at a low
cost. There are some diﬀerences, however. Now the optimal ﬁxed propor-
tions strategy does slightly better than the empirical life-cycle portfolio for
the higher two education categories under baseline expense ratios and his-
torical equity returns. A 100 percent stocks strategy actually dominates for
these education groups under the high expense ratio scenario, as their
background wealth makes them eﬀectively less risk averse, while the life-
cycle funds here cost 120 basis points compared to the equity fund’s 100 ba-
sis points.
The pattern of results when the household has non-PRA wealth is quite
similar to the pattern when it has no other wealth. There is often an opti-
mal ﬁxed proportions and optimal linear life-cycle portfolio that generates
certainty equivalents at least as high as those from the empirical life-cycle
funds, especially when we consider the higher average expense ratios that
investors actually pay in empirical life-cycle funds.
8.5 Conclusions
This chapter presents evidence on the distribution of balances in PRA
retirement saving accounts under various assumptions about the asset
allocation strategies that investors choose. In addition to a range of age-
invariant strategies, such as an all-bond and an all-stock strategy, we con-
sider several diﬀerent “life-cycle funds” that automatically alter the in-
vestor’s mix of assets as he or she ages. These funds oﬀer investors a higher
portfolio allocation to stocks at the beginning of a working career than as
they approach retirement, but in many cases charge higher expense ratios.
We also consider a No Lose allocation strategy for retirement saving, in
which households purchase enough riskless bonds at each age to ensure
that they will have no less than their nominal contribution when they reach
retirement age and then invest the balance in corporate stock. This strat-
egy combines a riskless ﬂoor for retirement income with some upside in-
vestment potential.
Our results suggest several conclusions about the eﬀect of investment
strategy on retirement wealth. The expected utility associated with diﬀer-
ent PRA asset allocation strategies, and the ranking of these strategies, is
very sensitive to four assumptions: the expected return on corporate stock,
the relative risk aversion of the investing household, the amount of non-
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expenses associated with the given investment strategies. At modest levels
of risk aversion, or when the household has access to substantial non-PRA
wealth at retirement, the historical pattern of stock and bond returns im-
plies that the expected utility of an all-stock investment allocation rule is
greater than that from any of the more conservative strategies.
When we reduce the expected return on stocks by 300 basis points rela-
tive to historical values, however, other strategies dominate the all-equity
allocation for investors with high levels of relative risk aversion. For a risk
aversion parameter of 2, the expected utility associated with investing in an
optimally chosen mix of stocks and TIPS, or in an inexpensive life-cycle
product, is highest. For a risk aversion parameter of 4, the expected utility
associated with an optimally chosen ﬁxed portfolio of stocks and TIPS or
an optimally chosen linear life-cycle product is highest and is substantially
higher than investing 100 percent in stocks. The actual life-cycle products
available to investors often generate lower certainty equivalents than our
derived optima, but this is partly related to the expense ratios charged by
those products.
When households are calibrated to have non-PRA wealth, 100 percent
stocks is optimal for a risk aversion parameter of 2, and is not far from op-
timal even when equity returns are reduced by 300 basis points. For a risk
aversion parameter of 4, an optimally chosen ﬁxed portfolio of stocks and
TIPS, or a life-cycle product obtained at low cost, performs the best.
The analysis underscores the fact that avoiding high expense ratios is
critical for households saving for retirement in a PRA. Many of the avail-
able life-cycle products have higher expense ratios than could be achieved
by the household simply holding a stock index fund and some TIPS (or
bonds) and either holding them in ﬁxed proportions throughout their life-
time or rebalancing toward TIPS (or bonds) as they get older. Households
who are unable to do this on their own will not do terribly in life-cycle
funds, but they will lose money relative to what they could get if they exe-
cuted very simple investing strategies on their own.
Our analysis of life-cycle funds suggests three issues that warrant future
research. First, it is possible that life-cycle funds should be diﬀerent for
single individuals than for married couples. The focus in these funds so far
has been on accumulating wealth for retirement, and the conceptual justi-
ﬁcation for age-phased equity exposure would be age-related variation in
household risk aversion. Single individuals may have fewer opportunities
to respond to an adverse economic shock than married couples, so their
tolerance of equity market risk in their retirement accounts may be diﬀer-
ent from that for married couples.
Second, we have focused on only a limited set of outcome measures as-
sociated with diﬀerent asset allocation strategies. While we consider vari-
ous percentiles of the retirement wealth distribution, as well as the mean
290 James M. Poterba, Joshua Rauh, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wisevalue of wealth at retirement, and the expected utility associated with this
wealth value, other metrics may also deserve consideration. One possibil-
ity is the risk of shortfall associated with one strategy relative to another.
The Feldstein (2005) No Lose strategy eliminates the shortfall risk associ-
ated with a DC investment strategy relative to investing all contributions to
a DC plan in a zero-yield cash account. Shortfall risk measures could be
computed for a range of other strategies.
Third, we have not introduced any of the market imperfections or ele-
ments of behavioral economics that might aﬀect the estimated beneﬁts of
life-cycle funds. For example, we have not allowed retirement ages to vary
as a function of the household’s accumulated PRA balance. Allowing for
additional years of work when returns are unfavorable would reduce the
cost of low accumulation values. We have also assumed that when we as-
sign households to ﬁxed proportions strategies, they successfully rebalance
their portfolio so that they maintain the designated proportions. If house-
holds fail to do so, strategies such as life-cycle investing that automate such
portfolio decisions may aﬀect expected utility in ways that we have not cap-
tured.
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